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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the agricultural water 
pollution problem, its sources and effects, and to investigate means 
of control. The factors influencing soil erosion are examined with 
regard to natural components and man-made ones. Finally, the economic 
rationalization for the reduction of the externality is examined and 
the effect of abatement tools upon the level of pollution are analyzed . 
Water pollution from nonpoint sources (NPS) is a serious problem 
in the United States, affecting eighty-seven percent of all river 
basins (U.S.E.P.A. (39)). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
through its congressional mandate from the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments of 1972, has declared a 1983 goal of "fishable 
and swimmable" waters throughout the country. Because of the magnitude 
of NPS water pollution, the nation most probably will not meet this 
goal (Portney (29)). 
The sources of NPS water pollution are varied, and include urban 
runoff, construction site erosion, mining activity, forest area runoff 
and agricultural runoff. The major source of NPS water pollution is 
agricultural activity, affecting sixty-two percent of all river 
basins (U . S . E. P .A. (40)). 
For Iowa's rivers, particularly the Iowa and Cedar rivers basins, 
the major problems resulting from NPS water pollution are bacteria 
growth, the presence of excess nutrients, dissolved solids and 
pesticides. There are agricultural sources of all these residuals 
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(U.S.E.P.A. (39)). The problem of bacteria growth, and to some extent 
excess nutrients, is due mainly to feedlot operations (Wilson (43)). 
The remaining problems of dissolved solids and pesticides , as well as 
a large portion of the nutrient problem, are attributable to crop 
production practices. 
The pesticide and fertilizer residuals result from the same 
chemicals the farmer uses to produce his crops. These ingredients 
are washed from the soil in rain water or are transported into the 
stream with the sediment . The pesticides, particularly the oil-based 
ones, adhere to the soil particles and enter the stream with the 
water . Other chemicals, such as nitrogen, assimilate with the soil 
and enter the s tream with the sediment (Wilson (43)). 
The effects of pesticides on man and aquatic life are not well 
known. Man normally ingests small amounts of pesticides over a long 
period, storing the substances in his fatty tissue. The levels build 
up over time, increasing the risk to the carrier. This risk includes 
possible genetic problems and increased risk of cancer (Miranowski 
(26)). The pesticide issue will not be examined in this paper. 
The effects of the nutrients, while thought to be pervasive, are 
also not well-documented. The interaction of nitrogen and water will 
often result in nitrite formation; nitrites interfere with the movement 
of oxygen by hemoglobin in the blood of mammals. Phosphorous and the 
resulting phosphates act as a nutrient for plant algae. When phosphates 
are present in concentrated forms, their presence causes the algae 
to grow rapidly or bloom. This is part of the eutrophication process, 
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a natural process which normally takes thousands of years, turning 
lakes into marshes. However, when the bloom occurs, the algae die 
from lack of carbon dioxide and then decay. This decaying process 
upsets the ecological balance of the water body as it absorbs the 
available oxygen, depriving aquatic life of its needed oxygen . This 
furthers the eutrophication process , prematurely "killing" the body 
of water . Nitrites also contribute to the eutrophication process 
(Wilson (43); U. S . E.P.A. (40)) . 
The sediment from agricultural land, beyond serving as a delivery 
mechanism for the chemicals, is a direct problem. The sediment 
increases the turbidity of the water it enters, generally reducing 
the water's aesthetic value (Freeman (14)). The sediment also reduces 
the life of reservoir projects. When a river carrying sediment is 
impounded, that sediment will be dropped at the dam site, decreasing 
the reservoir's storage capacity . Also, to the extent that erosion 
is not planned for in the project, dam life will decrease . 
This paper proposes several ways to abate this sediment pollution. 
All strategies involve government intervention, justified on economic 
grounds because of the externalities produced by the pollution . The 
policy methods for dealing with the problem are compared based on 
costs, production levels, farmer incomes and pollution abatement . 
Organization 
This paper is organized into four sections. The first is a general 
introductory chapter, detailing the water pollution problem and 
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possible remedies. This chapter includes a brief rationale for 
economic involvement in the pollution problem. The second chapter 
presents the linear programming model used for analysis as well as 
some of its limitations. The third chapter discusses the data needs, 
how they are met, and the necessary assumptions. Finally, the results 
of the model and policy alternatives are detailed in the final 
chapter. 
Factors Influencing Soil Erosion 
The amount of soil loss in any time period is a function of many 
variables. There are both natural factors, inherent in the soil, and 
management factors, controllable by man's choices. Soil type, 
determined by the soil's parent material, greatly influences erosion 
levels. That quality of the soil which influences erosion is called 
erodibility, or the resistance of the soil to both transport and 
detachment. This erodibility is determined in part by the soil 
texture, the organic content, the stability of the soil, its shear 
strength, and its infiltration capacity (Morgan (27)). 
Another key factor is the slope of the plot. Holding other 
factors constant, an area which has a steeper slope than another can 
be expected to yield more soil. First, long steep slopes are 
generally characterized by less top soil and so are less permeable, 
resulting in more runoff . Second, the greater the slope the more 
energy the water collects. The water runs off the slope with a 
greater velocity, thereby increasing the water's capacity to carry 
a load. 
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These factors are natural. Other factors influence erosion which 
are management controlled. These factors include the choice of c rop and 
tillage method. Crop cover is an important factor in soil erosion . 
When rain drops fall they bombard the soil particles, forcing the 
particles loose. The crop cover or canopy shields the soil particles 
from the full erosive force of the rain. Leafy plants allow the rain 
to collect and drop slowly onto the soil, decreasing the rain ' s 
erosivity (Morgan (27); Wischmeier and Smith (44)). 
Tillage practices affect erosion by both changing the soil's 
canopy and the soil's physical properties. Depending on the type of 
tillage an operator uses, the timing of the tillage operation , and 
the direction of tillage, the soil erosion from a given plot can be 
expected to differ. For instance, the use of a moldboard plow reduces 
the amount of residue from the crop , instead incorporating the residue 
into the soil . This allows the rain to impact the soil with greater 
force. This residue incorporation does, however, increase the 
organic content of the soil, at least partially offsetting the 
increased erodibility . 
The timing of the primary tillage operation is also important as 
it determines how long the soil will be exposed to the natural forces . 
Soil which is tilled in the fall will be exposed to erosion forces 
longer than soil tilled in the spring and still longer than soil which 
is not tilled but is simply planted . By choosing the direction of 
planting, the operator can influence the soil erosion level. Tillage 
up and down the slope of the land will r esult in more erosion than 
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contour tillage which follows the contours of the land . This is due 
to the velocity of the water. Up-and-down tillage, especially with 
a row crop such as corn, leaves little to impede the running water; 
in fact the valley between the planting ridges serves as a channel, 
increasing the velocity and therefore the load carrying capacity of 
the water. 
Contour tillage serves to decrease the water's velocity, forcing 
the water to drop its load. As the water slows, more can infiltrate 
the top soil . 
A derivation of contour tillage, referred to as terracing, serves 
much the same purpose as contouring. Contour tillage is practicable 
only on soils of sufficient slope length; plots with slope lengths 
less than the minimum will result in destroyed contours. Terracing 
changes the slope length by physically changing the length of the plot . 
Embanlanents are placed so that contouring is possible. While this has 
all the benefits associated with contouring, it also has the added 
detriment of decreasing the land available for tillage and complicating 
the tillage process . 
Externalities and Economics 
One basic goal of economics is to provide an efficient allocation 
of resources. For a system to meet this goal, certain conditions must 
be met. Furthermore, through the economist's definition of efficiency, 
for any allocation to be Pareto-efficient, specific conditions must 
be met. For a market economy, these specific conditions include price 
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competition in all markets, all goods produced with constant or 
increasing costs, perfect knowledge, perfect mobility of resources, 
and no public goods . In general, a Pareto-efficient outcome is where 
the marginal rate of substitution for any pair of goods is equal to 
the marginal rate of transformation (Baumol (4)), In a private market 
economy, an efficient outcome is where the price of any good or service 
is equal to its marginal rate of transformation which is in turn equal 
to its marginal private cost . Since no public goods exist, price will 
then equal marginal social cost (MSC), seen as society's valuation for 
the production of a marginal unit . 
If we assume a social welfare function exists, we can find a 
Pareto-efficient resource allocation . This social welfare func tion 
must accurately relate the utility levels of all members of society; 
s uch a function is maximized where MSC equal marginal social benefits 
equal marginal private costs or price. If these conditions are not 
met, a Pareto-efficient allocation is not possible and resource 
misallocation will result. 
The source of this misallocation is usually referred to as an 
externality . If for whatever reason price does not equal MSC, i . e ., 
price does not reflect the true marginal cost to society, then an 
externality exists which results in a misallocation of resources. 
However, the presence of an externality does not preclude Pareto-
optimality; ceteris paribus, if the externality's price does not equal 
its MSC, a misallocation will occur (Baumol and Oates (5)). If the 
externality's price does equal the MSC of the externality, the 
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resulting allocation will be Pareto optimal although the externality 
may still exist. 
The conditions for a particular Pareto optimum, assuming the 
first-order and second-order conditions for Pareto optimality are met , 
can be determined with regard to a given market by maximizing 
producer and consumer surpluses. Assume some externality, created 
by the production of output Q, y ields a social damage function whose 
principal is the level of output, Q. Further, assume that this social 
damage function is Pareto-efficiently priced. Then the value of 
producer and consumer surpluses is given by 
IQO (1.1) P(8) d8 - [C(Q) + D(Q)] 
where P(8 ) can be seen as the demand function for the output Q, C(Q) 
as the total private cost, and D(Q) is the damage function relating 
society ' s valuation of the externality, Pareto-efficiently priced. 
Pareto optimality i s attained where this expression is 
maximized , or where 
(1. 2) J
Q 
a 
0 
P(e )de 
a Q [
a c(Q) + a n(Q) J 
aQ aQ 
0 
or: 
a J~ P(e )de 
(1.3) a Q 
= a c(Q) + a D(Q) 
aQ a Q 
with the appropriate second-order conditions of increasing costs or 
a downward sloping demand curve being satisfied. 
The left-hand side can be interpreted as price, the right-hand 
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side as marginal social cost. If the damage done by the production of 
Q is not priced, then the economy will not achieve Pareto optimality. 
. . aC(Q) Price will not equal MSC but rather marginal private cost , aQ 
When this condition of price equaling MSC is not met, society is 
not operating along its production possibilities frontier. The 
production mix is suboptimal by the Kaldor criteria and some change 
is possible which will benefit at least one person without making 
others worse off. 
The externality problem has long been recognized by economists 
and many classification systems have been developed to aid in 
rectifying the problem. By one set of terminology, the pollution 
resulting from soil erosion is a technological externality. Such an 
externality exists when the assumption of independent utility or 
production functions is violated. 
Associated with the concept of a technological externality is a 
classification system distinguishing between unpaid factors of 
production and the creation of an atmosphere effect. This unpaid 
factor of production classification is very similar to a common 
property resource problem, with Meade's example of apple nectar and 
bees being the often-cited case (Meade (25)). 
Bator extended theoretically the previous system to include three 
types of technological externalities : ownership, technical, and 
public good (Bator (2)). An ownership externality is basically 
Meade's unpaid factor of production and results from a divorce of 
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effective resource ownership from the user. Utilizing Bator's 
terminology, a technical externality is an example of a natural 
monopoly, or the case of increasing return.s to scale. A public good 
externality closely follows the definition of a public good: when 
one person's consumption of the externality does not reduce the 
level available for others and no price exists for the product, i .e., 
the externality. 
Water pollution resulting from soil erosion, and most other 
pollution problems, are examples of Bator's public good externality. 
With the soil erosion problem, the system fails for lack of 
existence. A priori, no market for large numbers of participants 
exists which will accurately price the soil erosion by incorporating 
the costs such erosion forces on others downstream. It is the 
divergence between the farmer's private costs and the total cost to 
society which causes the externality and the resulting misallocation . 
Control Mechanisms 
Economists have suggested various policy options for controlling 
externalities, all of which are relevant for soil erosion. These 
options include taxation, subsidization, auction rights for polluting, 
direct regulation and other means incorporating certain aspects of 
these primary options, 
The economic goal of these methods is to reduce the pollution to 
the socially optimal level . To meet this goal, a tax may be levied 
on the pollutant or some directly related agent. The rationale for 
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the tax is straightforward: the marginal private costs are less than 
the marginal social costs. A properly designed tax will increase 
marginal private costs to the level of MSC. This is a Pigouvian tax 
in the tradition of the literature, where the tax on the externality 
producing activity is equal to the difference between marginal social 
and marginal private costs (Baumol (4); Baumol and Oates (5)). 
The subsidy tool is very similar to the tax in its effect on 
the resulting level of pollutant, but different in its approach. The 
method is to subsi dize the reduction in pollutant emission, with the 
subsidy payment being directly related to the level of reduced 
externality, on a per-unit basis. Frequently, the units are such 
that the subsidy may take on the character of a lump sum subsidy. 
Also, the nature of the subsidy may be either general or specific . 
The general form is directed solely at abatement . The specific form 
subsidizes one or a set of specific practices which may or may not 
be the least cost means of abatement. In either case, the s ubsidy 
is on the pollution creating activity. 
The question of symmetrical effects between Pigouvian taxes and 
subsidies has generated a great deal of discussion in the literature; 
does a per-unit subsidy for pollution abatement yield the same outcome 
as a per-unit tax on pollutant emissi on , if both account for the 
marginal damage of the pollution? There seems to be general agreement 
that in a static equilibrium with all firms sharing the same technology , 
plant and equipment, properly designed truces or subsidies are equivalent 
in their effects (Kamien, et al. (19); Bramhall and Mills (8)). However, 
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as these conditions are relaxed this symmetry breaks down. 
In a dynamic context, bribes and charges may not be symmetrical, 
especially if production functions are not known to the bribe/charge 
setting authority. Assume the maximum bribe the authorit y sets is a 
s tatic value and for whatever reason the discharging firm's marginal 
revenue function increases. If the marginal revenue function increases 
sufficiently, the profit maximizing firm will ignore the bribe and 
produce as before the authority intervened. If the authority increases 
the maximum bribe for every change in the demand function, then the 
result will be symmetrical with the tax result, assuming the information 
needed to adjust the bribe is costless. If this information is not 
costless, then the subsidy will be inferior to the tax with respect to 
controlling pollutant emissions (Kamien, et al. (19), (20); Tullock (36)) . 
Now assume all firms do not share the same capital stock nor the 
same technology. Then, within an industry at any time some firms are 
barely staying in operation, some have marginally failed and left the 
industry, and some may be enjoying profits. If a subsidy is introduced, 
ignoring the aforementioned problems, then each firm will reduce its 
emissions to the level where the marginal cost of emission reduction is 
equal to the subsidy. However, if the subsidy is not firm-specific 
but is based on industry-wide emissions, it is possible that some firms 
may make a profit on the subsidy . It is also possible that this profit 
will result in increased output industry-wide through an increase in 
the number of firms in the industry. There now is profit to be made 
if the appropriate pollution minimizing production function is used 
(Baumol and Oates (5)). 
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The asymmetry which develops between these two control options 
when these conditions are relaxed implies a tradeoff in efficiency 
exists . 
The tool of pollution rights auction involves setting up a 
pseudo-market for pollution. In general, a relevant externality exists 
because a market does not exist which accurately prices this exter-
nality, a result of the lack of property rights of the polluted medium 
or perhaps the high transactions costs associated with a solution. To 
remedy this situation, a market may be established where polluters bid 
for the right to pollute. If the number of participants is s ufficiently 
large and the necessary information is known, then this market will 
approach a competitive situation. The polluters involved will increase 
their bids to approach their maximum willingness to pay. In this way, 
finns which value their pollution rights more heavily can still produce 
and at the same time society has controlled the amount of pollution. 
In an imperfect world where information is not costless, the 
auction method may be desirable. Both the Pigouvian tax and subsidy 
methods require knowledge of pollution's marginal damage function. The 
auction rights method also requires this knowledge to a degree. The 
difference is that a tax and subsidy program must be administered on a 
continuing basis in a changing economy; the auction method need not. 
The remaining tool, that of direct regulation of the polluter, is 
perhaps the least "economic" of all means. The method involves the 
use of raw government power and is basically an extension of the "taking" 
power of government. Under this policy, a maximum amount of pollutant 
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is allowed, with the level being chosen with regard to human health 
and safety. Under the static situation described above with respect 
to the symmetry argument, the direct regulation tool is inferior. 
Assume that within an industry each firm has a different production 
function and a different marginal cost relationship. Then an across-
the-board limitation, which limits each firm ' s emission to the same 
level, will not be the least cost means of attaining the desired 
abatement level. 
For the soil erosion case, such a restriction may be a physical 
limit equal to the tolerance (t) value on soil loss per acre . Such a 
t value is selected toward the goal of maintaining long term soil 
productivity (Logan (23)). 
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CHAPTER II. MODEL 
To examine the effects of different policies on soil erosion 
in the Four Mile Creek watershed, a linear programming model was 
developed. The unit of analysis is a set of aggregate farms, each of 
which is representative of a subset of farms in the watershed. These 
aggregate farms reflect the physical factors associated with a particular 
subset of farms, such as soil type and field slope. This representation 
of physical factors is important for soil erosion considerations. Each 
of these aggregate farms is made up of several soil types which 
represent the proportion of soils in the individual aggregate . 
These aggregate farms are made up of a number of smaller farms. 
Per farm or average estimates of net income and soil loss by both farm 
type and for the basin can be obtained. 
I assume the objective function of the farmers is to maximize net 
farm income . The aggregate farm units are made up of several individual 
farms; assuming no scale economies or diseconomies are associated with 
the aggregate unit, then both the individual farms and the aggregate 
farms share the same objective function. 
I further assume each of the aggregates act independently of all 
other aggregates. Therefore, the goal of maximizing net income fo r 
each of the aggregates is the same as a goal of maximizing net income 
for the entire basi n. Also, in this manner policy options which serve 
to restrict soil losses can yield information about how income changes 
between aggregates, even if total basin-wide income remains constant . 
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Similarly, a policy which seeks to optimally allocate these r estrictions 
on a watershed basis would consider these five aggregates simultaneously . 
For our purposes, net income is taken to be total revenue from 
cropping activities, minus all costs except returns to land, risk and 
management. All other labor is assumed to be hired by the operator . 
A "baseline" solution is first obtained, reflecting current patterns 
of cropping practices . This baseline solution necessarily assumes 
optimality. That is, the solution assumes that with given prices and 
technology, the farms are operating at their optimal levels of inputs 
and outputs. Although this may or may not be true, to analyze policy 
effects this assumption is needed. 
Before explaining the model's objective function and constraint s , 
it should be noted that the solution is not the long run solution. 
Only if the current mix of inputs and outputs is the same as the 
optimal long run mix, including the farm size variable, will the base-
line solution be the long run preintervention solution. 
The model assumes a given technology. When looking at long term 
effects, this technology must be allowed to change. Ruttan and others 
have stated that scarcity of agricultural production factors induces 
technological change. Specifically, the presence of scarcity tends to 
induce technological change in the direction of augmenting the scarce 
factor ' s productivity. But as this model seeks to describe a given 
situation and account for the somewhat shorter term effects of policy 
actions, the model is not capable of incorporating this change . 
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While this analysis is assumed to occur in a partial equilibrium 
setting, this may not be representative. If any or all of these 
programs were to be adopted nationwide, general equilibrium adjustments 
could be expected . Prices for farm products would adjust; for a program 
which forced the dramatic reduction in the acres planted in row crops, 
one could expect a shift to hay and so a decrease in the price of hay. 
Also, since the distribution of soil erosion is not homogenous through-
out the country, these programs could result in some redis-t:ribution of 
income between farms and regions . 
Many assumptions are implicit in the use of a linear programming 
model. The first of these is the linearity or proportionality 
assumption. This assumption, put simply, means that outputs are 
linearly or proportionally related to the input level . This is not a 
restrictive assumption given the model ' s linear objective function. 
However, this implies no scale effects exist for the farmer. If 
historical patterns reveal anything, larger farms become more prevalent 
over time. This implies scale effects do exist. Considering the huge 
investment in machinery needed to farm, it seems reasonable that 
economies in farm size are present for certain ranges of acreage . It 
is also possible that new technologies may have the opposite impact on 
farm size; this is an empirical question the model does not address . 
The second assumption is divisibility . The use of the model implies 
all the inputs are perfectly divisible and continuous. This means that 
if the results involve one half an acre, the optimum is one half an 
acre, not necessarily a whole acre. However, the results will be 
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reported to the next smallest integer. 
The third assumption needed is additivity. This assumption requires 
the sum of inputs used in each cropping mix must equal the total amount 
of these inputs used by each cropping mix for all the inputs. This 
assumption must be met for each input and collectively for all inputs. 
The fourth assumption is that the model must be constrained or 
finite. There must be restrictions on the amounts of inputs and outputs 
that can be used or withdrawn from the system. This requirement is 
met by having a finite number of possible activities and constraints. 
In addition, we must assume all variables are nonnegative (Randolph, 
and Meeks (30)). 
The model simulates the effects of different control policies on 
the level of erosion; the effects of these policies are then analyzed 
with regard to the baseline solution. Aggregate soil erosion levels 
and net farm income levels are compared . Finally, administrative 
costs and the cost effectiveness of each program in controlling soil 
erosion are compared. 
The objective function of the linear programming model is to 
maximize net revenue or income for each of the five aggregate farms, 
given as: 
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(2.1) Z = (max) E Ri 
i=l 
subject to the aggregate resource constraints and policy directives . 
The Ri is the total net farm income for aggregate i, as defined earlier. 
These net income estimates are for an average or expected crop year 
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and for a price vector which is assumed plausible. Crop yields were 
estimated on the basis of an average year, as were fertilizer and 
pesticide inputs. 
The net income of the ith aggregate is given by: 
where: 
PS 
s irjt 
i 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 referring to the watershed aggregate 
r = 1, 2, 3 referring to the rotation used 
j 1, 2, 3 referring to the conservation practice 
used 
t 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 referring to the tillage practice used 
price of corn 
bushels of corn sold in the ith study aggregate using the 
rth rotation, the tth tillage practice, and the jth 
conservation practice. 
price of soybeans 
bushels of soybeans sold in the ith study aggregate using 
the rth rotation, the jth conservation practice, and the 
tth tillage practice 
PH price of hay 
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tons of hay sold in the ith aggregate using the rth 
rotation, the jth conservation practice, and the tth 
tillage practice 
price of oats 
bushels of oats sold in the ith study aggregate using 
the rth rotation, the jth conservation practice, and the 
tth tillage practice 
acres in cultivation in the ith study aggregate, using 
the rth rotation, the jth conservation practice, and the 
tth tillage practice 
price of labor or wage rate 
hours of labor used in the ith study aggregate for the rth 
rotation, the ith conservation practice, and the tth 
tillage practice 
price of nitrogen 
pounds of nitrogen used in the ith study aggregate for the 
rth rotation, the jth conservation practice, and the tth 
tillage practice 
price of phosphorous 
pounds of phosphorous used in the ith study aggregate for 
the rth rotation, the jth conservation practice, and the 
tth tillage practice 
price of potassium 
pounds of potassium used in the ith study aggregate for the 
rth rotation, the jth conservation practice, and the tth 
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tillage practice 
price vector of herbicides 
units of corresponding herbicide applied in the ith study 
aggregate for the rth rotation, the jth conservation 
practice, and the tth tillage practice 
price vector of insecticides 
units of corresponding insecticide applied in the ith 
study aggregate for the rth rotation, the jth conservation 
practice, and the tth tillage practice 
price vector of machinery services 
units of corresponding machinery service used in the ith 
study aggregate for the rth rotation, the jth conservation 
practice, and the tth tillage practice. 
Given this formulation of the objective function, the only physical 
constraint in the model is that acreages in a given aggregate must not 
exceed the total acreage available: 
(2 . 3) EEE Airjt s Ai 
rjt 
The effects of government policies are incorporated into the model 
by imposing new constraints and changing the parameter estimates in the 
model. The purpose of these changes is to reflect changes in the 
farmer's decision variables and to simulate the effect of direct 
regulation of soil loss in the study area. The policies are : 
1. Governmen t limitation on per acre soil loss. Soil loss comes 
about as a result of the farmer ' s choice of crop rotation, tillage 
practice, and conservation practice, and the given soil types of the 
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land. Due to its causes, soil loss can be regulated by either 
restricting the possible choices of practices or by restricting average 
soil loss per acre, as determined by the Universal Soil Loss Equation 
(Wischmeier and Smith (44)). These restrictions on practices are seen 
as eliminating certain practices by government edict, thereby reducing 
the farmer's choices. The per-acre soil loss restriction can be seen 
as limiting erosion to an average of three, five, or ten tons of soil 
loss per acre. All three levels are examined. 
These levels are selected to be representative t values, mentioned 
earlier. A brief discussion of the t values is needed at this point. 
Tolerance values vary between one and five tons of soil loss per acre 
per year. They were originally formulated for benchmark soils in 1962 , 
and were based on three criteria (Smith and Stamey (35); Logan (23)) . 
A rate was needed that would reduce soil loss to a level which would 
maintain soil productivity over the long term. Also, a rate was 
needed which would retard severe gullying and at the same time be 
consistent with maintaining plant nutrient levels. These criteria 
are based on the recognition that soil is a renewable resource, albeit 
one with a long gestation period. 
While the t values were selected with regard to topsoil thickness, 
their use should be prudent. Although this thickness in part determines 
the particular value, little regard was paid to the ability of the 
subsoil to grow crops in the event of total topsoil loss. Many of 
these subsoils could function well as top soil, especially once the 
organic content is increased. Thus, these t values may in fact hold 
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little r elevance for t he true acceptable rate of soi l loss , as defined 
by the three criteria (Logan (23)). 
2. User charges or taxes. Under this policy, soil loss is taxed 
on a per-ton basis. The tax rate is determined by the change in the 
erosion level . Different tax levels are entered into the model to 
determine a relationship between soil erosion and tax levels. The soil 
erosion r esulting from each tillage practice, rotation selection, and 
conservation practice mix is taxed at $1 , $5, $10 per ton. 
3. Subsidies . These subsidies can take two forms: a general per 
ton subsidy based on soil erosion abatement or a specific subsidy . The 
per ton subsidy is paid directly to farmers and is based on the decr ease 
in soil erosion from a base level . This base level is the erosi on level 
obtained in the baseline solu tion . For every ton of soil the oper ator 
saves above the base level, using the least cost means, the operator 
will receive $S, some subsidy level. This subsidy level varies between 
the same levels as the tax solution . 
The practice-specific subsidy supports the use of certain practices, 
the decision having been made before hand that these practices were the 
most desirable for erosion abatement . The subsidy serves to dec r ease 
the costs associated with using these practices, thereby increasing the 
net income derived from acreages where these practices are r elevant. 
These practices include terracing, contouring, and zero-till planting. 
The tax or charge and the general subsidy are expected to be 
equivalent in their effect on the pollution level. A tax on the 
discharge will result in the profit maximizing operator discharging 
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effluent or allowing soil erosion up to the level where marginal 
abatement costs just equal the tax . A general subsidy will result in 
the profit maximizer adopting soil conservation measures to the point 
where marginal abatement costs equal the subsidy. The tax program and 
the subsidy program are expected to result in the same level of abate-
ment. However, income levels will be different. Also, a problem 
exists since the subsidy level is determined by abatement, figured 
from some level. The tax solution is based solely on erosion abatement, 
regardless of the base level. 
Different subsidy levels are encountered in the model with 
respect to the practice specific subsidies. The costs of terracing and 
zero-till planting are hypothesized to be shared by some government 
agency, at varying rates. Levels of 50 percent, 75 percent, and 
90 percent subsidization are examined for their effects. The selection 
of these levels to test was largely arbitrary and intended to be 
expository of the nature of farmers reactions to conservation practices. 
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CHAPTER III. STUDY AREA DATA 
The Study Area 
The study area under analysis is the Four Mile Creek watershed, 
a drainage basin for a tributary of Wolf Creek. The basin is wholly 
contained within Tama County, Iowa, and is principally located in 
Lincoln and Grant townships; a small portion of the basin is in Crystal 
township . The watershed is comprised of some eight thousand acres, 
nearly all of which are in agricultural use. 
The predominant soil of the basin is Tama Silt Loam, although 
Downs Silt Loam and soils of the Wabash-Judson complex are present in 
considerable amounts. The basin is made up to a large extent by 
undulating to level, dark-colored, well-drained soils, i.e., soils 
having slopes of less than eight percent . 
The more moderate colored soils, such as the Downs Silt Loams, are 
generally characterized by steeper slopes. Gradients of twel ve to 
sixteen percent are not unconnnon, although such soils do not make up 
a large portion of the basin (see Table 3 . 1). 
All of these soils except the Wabash series are derived from loess, 
a finely textured silty deposit usually laid down by wind (Batten and 
Gibson, (3)). The thickness of this loess varies, but generally is 
about ten feet thick in the watershed (Aandahl and Simonson (1)). On the 
more hilly sections the loess is much less thick. The Wabash soils are 
flood plain deposits, usually gently sloping (gradients of two to five 
percent) . These Wabash soils, due to their flood plain location, are 
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Table 3.1 . Soil type acreages of Four-Mile Creek Watersheda 
Slope classificationb 
Soil type A B C D E 
Downs silt loam 500 
Tama silt loam 2100 2200 600 
Wabash-Judson 2000 
Muscatine silt 
loam 400 
a 
Source: Aandahl and Simonson (1). 
b 
Slope classifications: A= 0-2%; B = 2-5%; C = 5-9%; D 9-14% . 
Table 3.2. Corn suitability ratings for major soil types and slope 
phases in Four-Mile Creek Watersheda 
Soil type 
Downs silt loam 
Tama silt loam 
Wabash-Judson 
Muscatine silt loam 
a 
Fenton, et al. (12). 
Slope phase 
A 
A 
B 
c 
D 
A 
A 
b 
Slope classifications: A = 0-2%; B 
Corn suitability 
rating 
90 
100 
95 
78 
68 
60 
100 
2 . 5%; C = 5-9%; D 9-14%. 
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usually fingerlike extensions which follow the streambed . 
The basin is made up of soils ideally suited for row crops, 
parti.cularly corn. A Corn Suitability Rating (CSR) is an index of a 
soil's ability to foster corn growth; the CSR's for the most prevalent 
soil s in the Four Mile Creek watershed are very high and are given in 
Table 3.2. These soils are among the best in the world for growing 
corn and soybeans (Batten and Gibson (3)). 
Model Data Requirements 
The formulation of the model required various types of data derived 
from very different sources . Principally, yield data for crop rotations, 
various input requirements, and soil erosion levels corresponding with 
different mixes of c r op rotation, conservation practice, and tillage 
practice were needed . The first two sets were needed to obtain the 
net revenue figures the model seeks to maximize . Soil erosion levels 
were needed to simulate the effects of government action and to 
indicate the extent of the externality associated with different 
cropping practices. 
Yield data were required to find gross revenue or income figures 
from cropping activities for each of the five study aggregates . These 
data came from two sources: a survey of farmers in the watershed and 
publications of the Iowa State University Agronomy Extension office . 
The farmer survey was conducted by Dr. John Miranowski during the 
months of March and April, 1980. This survey provided data for different 
crop rotation and tillage practice mixes and was useful in determining 
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the timing of tillage operations. The Extension Office publications 
provided yield data for specific crops . 
Input data were required so that net revenue figures could be 
determined. These estimates came from a variety of sources , including 
both the survey and Extension publications mentioned above. Fertilizer 
requirements were derived from Extension publications. Suggested 
fertilizer levels were available for different management levels and 
subsoil moisture levels (Voss (41)). The higher levels were chosen 
because generally the farms in the watershed are intensely managed, 
based upon a survey of local producers. 
These fertilizer requirements were given for basic soil types; in 
calculating fertilizer requirements for different slope phases of the 
same soil type, a proportionate measure was used. That is, a proportion 
of the fertilizer requirements similar to the proportionate yield of 
the soils was used . A soil whose yield was ninety percent of the 
best soil within that classification was assumed to require ninety 
percent of that best soil's fertilizer requirements. This interpolation 
method is consistent with the method used by the Extension Service for 
the general fertilizer recommendations (Voss (41)). These fertilizer 
requirements are given in Tables A.l and A.2. 
Pesticide requirements were determined in a three stage process. 
First, the percent of organic matter in the soils was determined. 
This percent divided the soils into three classifications: heavy, 
medium and light. Next , the survey data were examined to determine the 
type of pesticide used. Finally, a pesticide guide was consulted to 
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determine the correct level of application for both herbicides and 
insecticides. These values were selected for specific crop rotations 
and tillage practices, the respective herbicide values are given in 
Tables A.3a to A.3e. The insecticide requirements are the same for 
all soil types and are relevant only for corn; the insecticide Counter 
lSG is applied at a rate of six and one-half (6.5) pounds per acre 
(1978 Chemical Crop Protection Guide (28)). 
Net revenue figures were derived for each crop rotation , tillage 
practice, and conservation mix for each study aggregate. These net 
revenue figures were obtained using the farm budget generator. This 
generator takes described input and output levels and, using given 
prices, yields a set of data from which net revenue as defined for the 
model can be derived. These prices are given in Table A.4. 
The soil composition of the study aggregates was determined on an 
ad hoc basis . A map of farm ownership boundaries was superimposed on 
a map of soil types in the basin. Visual inspection led to the 
conclusion that there were five types of farms, or five sets of farms 
which generally shared the same soil makeup . The description of each 
study aggregate is given in Table 3.3. 
Measurement of Soil Erosion 
The study area contains six prevalent soil types and slope phases 
of those types; in addition, approximately nine soil types are present 
in insignificant amounts. The measure of soil erosion from these soils 
is given by the Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE). The USLE was 
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Table 3 . 3. Aggregat e farm soil types and corresponding proportion 
and acreage 
Farm Soil type a Proportion Acreage 
1 WM . 5 15% 
DSL .5 
2 TSL .5 35% 
TSR .25 
TSE • 25 
3 TSE .so 20% 
WM .33 
TSR . 17 15% 
4 TSL . 5 
TSR . 33 
WM . 17 
5 TSL . 5 15% 
TSR .25 
MS .25 
a WM : Wabash silt loam - 0-2% 
DSL : Downs silt loam - 2-5% 
TSL: Tama silt loam - 2- 5% 
TSR: Tama silt loam - 5-9% 
TSE: Tama silt loam - 9-14% 
MS : Muscatine silt loam - 0- 2%. 
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developed by a branch of the U. S. Department of Agriculture as an 
attempt to reduce the gross soil loss in tons per unit area to all 
major factors influencing sheet and soil erosion (Wischmeier and Smith 
(44)) . Its use is most valid east of the Mississippi river and in 
Iowa and Missouri. The USLE has the form: 
(3.1) A R·K·L·S·C·P 
where: A = computed soil loss in tons per acre for a given period . 
R = the rainfall erosivity index for the given period in 
feet ton units. This represents the effect of a rain-
drop's impact and the intensity of the rainfall. 
K = the soil erodibility factor . K reflects the inherent 
erosion characteris tics of the soil. The facto r is 
determined empirically and is the ratio of erosion per 
unit of R from a unit plot of each soil type. This 
unit plot was chosen to be one acre of land in continuous 
fallow condition , tilled for a period of at least two 
years, having a slope of nine percent and a slope length 
of seventy-two and six-tenths (72 . 6) feet. On the unit 
plot, L, S , C, and P equal unity and K then becomes A 
divided by R (Morgan (27)). 
L·S the slope length and steepness factors. The slope length 
factor, L, and the slope steepness factor, S, are usually 
combined into a single factor, LS. LS is the ratio of 
soil loss per unit area from a particular field to that 
(3.2) LS 
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of the unit plot. This factor is computed with a 
formula estimated by Wischmeier and Smith (44). 
Ll/2 (.0076 + .0535 · S + .00076 
C = the crop factor. It is the ratio of soil loss for a 
given rotation to that from bare soil. 
P = the conservation practice or support practice factor. 
It is the ratio of soil loss under a given practice 
on a particular soil to the soil loss r esulting from 
straight row tillage. 
The R value for the study area was supplied by the U.S.D . A. and 
was found to be 175. The K values for each of the major soil types 
and associated slopes are given in Table 3. 4 . 
The C values, relating crop and management effects on erosion, 
were determined by the use of a U.S.D.A. technical publication 
(U.S.D .A. (37)). These values are given for each rotation, tillage 
method, and conservation practice . These rotations include continuous 
corn (C-C), corn followed by soybeans (C-B), and corn followed by 
corn followed by oats followed by two years of meadow (C-C-0-M-M). The 
tillage methods considered are fall moldboard plowing (FM), fall chisel 
plowing (FC), spring moldboard plowing (SM), spring chisel plowing (SC), 
and a zero tillage method (NT). The conservation practices considered 
are straight row or up-and-down plowing, contour plowing, and terraced 
fields. The C factors for crop rotations and tillage practices are 
contained in Table 3.5. 
Table 3.4. 
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a 
K values for major soil types 
Soil t e 
Downs silt loam 
Tama silt loam 
Wabash- Judson 
Muscatine silt loam 
K 
.32 
.32 
.10 
.28 
aPaul Rosenberry, Economics and Statistics Service, U.S.D.A., 
Iowa St a t e University. Private communication, June 15, 1980 . 
Table 3 . 5. a USLE C factors for crop rotations and tillage practice 
CroE rotation 
Til lage pr actice c-c C-B C-C-0-M- M 
Fall moldboard plow .48 .56 .17 
Fall chisel plow .25 .32 b 
Spring moldboard plow . 36 . 46 .10 
Spring chisel plow . 22 . 28 .09 
Zero tillage .07 . 09 .04 
aSource : U.S.D.A. (37) . 
b 
C-C-0-M- M rotation is not associated with the fall chisel pl ow 
tillage pr actice. 
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The P values, the support practice factors, were derived from the 
Wischmeier and Smith publication (44). These values are given for 
contour tillage and contour tillage on terraced fields. Contour tillage 
is effective only on fields of sufficient slope length. If a field 's 
slope is sufficiently steep and its length short enough, then the 
ridges formed by contour plowing will be destroyed more frequently as 
storms increase in intensity . Maximum slope lengths for contouring 
without terracing are given below. I assume no contour plowing can 
occur on fields which exceed these values. Rather, for the operator 
to contour plow these steep slopes, he must first terrace (Wischmeier, 
and Smith (44)) . 
Slope phase Maximum length (feet) 
A 400 
B 300 
c 200 
D 120 
E 80 
Terracing serves to decrease the field's slope length, reducing 
the speed of the runoff. Because of this, terracing affects the USLE 
not only through the P or support practice factor but also through LS, 
the slope length factor (Wischmeier and Smith (44)). The new maximum 
slope lengths are given below: 
Slope phase Maximum length (feet) 
A 175 
B 130 
c 120 
D 120 
E 110 
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The P values for contour plowing, including the use of terraces, are 
given in Table 3.6 . Terracing costs are assumed to be only construction 
costs and increased fuel usage. The increased fuel usage is the same 
as the increase for contouring. The terraces considered are backslope 
terraces where the backslope of the terrace is grass covered. The 
const ruction costs of these terraces are based on a price per linear 
foot; the amount of linear feet needed varies according to the terrace 
spacing requirement. For a given area, this spacing requirement is 
determined by the slope of the land (James (17)). Terrace spacing 
requirements for different slopes are given in Table 3.7. The amount 
of linear feet of terracine that each slope classification requires can be 
estimated by the ratio of the number of square feet in an acre to the 
required spacing, yielding the second column of Table 3.7 . Terracing 
costs were then estimated to be the number of linear feet of terracing 
needed times a fixed rate per linear foot of $1.11 (James (17)) . 
The cost of contour plowing is assumed to be entirely increased 
fuel usage. The percentage increase in fuel use by slope classification 
is: A-5%, B-5%, C- 5%, D-7% , E-7% {Walker (42)). 
A note of caution in the use of the USLE is needed. The USLE was 
designed to predict the long term average soil losses in runoff for 
specific cropping and management practices. It is an average measure 
of gross soil loss through runoff and as an average measure has some 
variability. The parameter values can be expected to vary greatly 
from storm to storm but it is thought these variations tend to offset 
36 
Table 3.6. USLE P factor for slope classification 
Contour tillage 
Slope phase P value 
A . 60 
B .50 
c .50 
D .60 
E • 70 
Table 3.7 . Terrace spacing requirement a 
Horizontal spacing Linear feet 
Slope phase (feet) requirement 
A 220 198 
B 110 396 
c 100 435 
D 82 530 
E 75 580 
a 
Source: James (17). 
one another in the long term. 
Also, the USLE was originally presented as a model explaining soil 
loss east of the Rocky Mountains. Experience has shown it to be most 
reliable in the humid areas where rainfall is more frequent and soils 
have better infra-structures (Morgan (27)). 
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Administrative Costs 
Administrative costs for each policy program were determined on 
the basis of conversations with Ted Hall, Soil Conservation Service 
district agent for Tama County. I questioned Mr. Hall as to personnel 
needs for each program and anticipated legal costs. I felt the largest 
cost associated with each program would be in personnel and their 
time. Accordingly, the only costs included were those pertaining to 
personnel and their support . These personnel costs are broken down 
into four categories: farm-needs-analysis costs, monitoring costs, 
reporting costs, and fixed costs of needed personnel. This breakdown 
is not meant to totally account for all costs of each program; printing , 
transportation, laboratory testing and many other costs are sure to be 
incurred. However, I felt these were either insignificant or would be 
the same for all programs. Thus the costs given are meant to be 
expository of each program's total cost, not necessarily a true 
delineation. 
The costs as presented can be seen as continuing costs and one-
time or start-up costs . The farm needs analysis costs are best seen as 
one-time costs, since they do not recur over the life of a policy . The 
monitoring costs, reporting costs and fixed costs of personnel are 
continuing costs and so are given on an annual basis. 
The costs of each program, in terms of time, are different although 
some factors are nearly the same. For instance, reporting costs do 
not vary greatly between programs. This is because I assumed writing 
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and typing requirements were nearly the same for all programs, an 
assumption Mr. Hall agreed with. 
Farm-needs-analysis costs are based on the number of trips a 
technician needs to make to the farm site. Each hour of the technician's 
time is assumed to cost $7 .00, based on an annual salary of approximately 
$14,500. Each hour of a secretary's time costs $4 . 50, based on an 
annual salary of approximately $9,500. These needs-analysis-costs vary 
with the intensity of observation and the number of trips. The intensity 
of observation is reflected in the time spent per trip . Generally, a 
program which requires more time to analyze the problem will cost more 
than a simpler program. For instance, direct regulation of soil loss 
is very time consuming in the needs analysis stage whereas the direct 
regulation of specific practices is not. The former requires a know-
ledge of what is occurring whereas the latter is only concerned with 
what practices are used in the future. The needs analysis costs of the 
terracing program include fifty hours of planning and supervision of 
construction per farm. 
Monitoring costs are determined in much the same way. These costs 
vary with the number of trips needed to each farm and with the amount 
of work to be done at each farm. The direct regulation of soil loss 
requires several visits per year with approximately one hour per visit 
to check the soil loss, whereas a program such as the direct regulation 
of specific practices requires very little monitoring time per visit. 
Both the tax solution and the general subsidy solution require large 
amounts of monitoring time to enable an accurate determination of the 
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tax and subsidy levels . The specific subsidy program's cos t s do not 
vary much between each program. The t err acing option requir es much 
t he same monitoring time as does the zero tillage subsidy. 
Office maintenance costs include office space, at thirty-five 
squa r e feet per person, and fixed labor costs of twenty percent of 
salary. The office space costs are not charged to any program, only 
set forward. The fixed labor costs are determined by the number of 
employees needed. These costs are given in Tables B.l to B. S. 
The presence of these administrative costs serves to increase the 
social cost of erosion abatement for each program. The administrative 
costs, as presented, are not intended to represent all of the administra-
tive costs of a program. Information costs and enforcement costs would 
be incurred . It is plausible to assume that as abatement increases 
information costs would remain constant; the same assumption is not 
necessarily plausible for enforcemen t costs. As pollution decreases , 
the enforcement of further prescribed decreases could become more 
difficult. At these higher abatement levels more incentive exists to 
avoid the program. 
It is in the area of enforcement costs that legal costs are most 
relevant . No figures for anticipated legal costs are given because none 
were available. However, Mr. Hall felt that generally any program which 
took a farmer ' s money would meet stiff legal resistance . Thus it was 
felt the s ubsidy and direct regulation policies would result in lower 
legal costs than the tax program. Also, the direct regulation, by 
both practice and soil loss, would result in higher legal costs than 
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the subsidy approaches. Only the relative costs were discussed, as 
Mr. Hall was reluctant to place a monetary figure on any program's 
legal costs. 
If the enforcement costs of these programs were known and 
accounted for, the optimal level of abatement would certainly be 
less. The results presented in the next chapter would change . The 
marginal costs of abatement would increase with the exact magnitude 
depending upon the enforcement cost function. The relative marginal 
social costs of each set of programs could be expected to change, 
implying a different optimal policy. 
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CHAPTER IV. ANALYSIS OF POLICY OPTIONS 
FOR CONTROLLING SOIL EROSION 
In order to compare the effects of different policies, the 
computer simulation was initially run with no policy constraints. This 
initial simulation will be referred to as the base line solution or the 
base run. The results of this and all other simulations are given in 
Appendix C. 
Base Line Solution 
In the base line solution the model selected a continuous corn 
rotation on all soils except those of the Wab~sh series . The corn-
soybeans rotation was selected for the Wabash soils. All farmland was 
tilled in a straight row fashion, with no contouring or terracing 
occurring. The optimum result involved all the continuous corn being 
tilled using a chisel plow in the fall. A chisel plow in the spring 
was the optimal tillage method for the corn-soybeans rotation, used 
on the Wabash soils. 
This baseline solution resulted in a net income of $1,782,510 
from cropping activities, or approximately $228.53 per acre in the 
basin . Since there are one hundred and four farms in the basin, this 
solution implies a net income of $17,139,75 per farm; this is an average 
figure based on an average of seventy-five acres per farm. Associated 
with this net income figure is a gross soil loss es timated to be 
approximately 73,815 tons within the entire watershed. This is an 
average soil loss per acre of 9.46 tons. The results of this baseline 
simulation are given in Table C.l. 
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Tax on Soil Loss 
The analysis of government intervention in the soil erosion problem 
first involved the use of a tax on soil erosion. This tax is on a per-
ton basis and the same rate applies throughout the basin. Levels of 
$1.00, $2.00, $5.00, and $10.00 per ton were investigated for their 
effect on soil loss and net income from cropping activities. The 
results of these taxes are given in Table C.l. 
A tax of $1.00 per ton of soil loss dramatically decreased basin 
wide soil loss while barely decreasing basin net income. Under this 
policy, gross soil loss was estimated to be 39,062 tons or a decrease of 
34,753 tons. Meanwhile, net income decreased from $1,782 ,510 to 
$1,741,720, a drop of $40,790; this decrease in net income is very 
close to the amount of revenue the government is assumed to have 
collected. 
The imposition of the $1.00 per ton tax resulted in substitution 
between tillage practices and conservation practices, but no 
substitution between crop rotations. The Wabash soils still used the 
chisel plow in the spring for the corn-soybeans rotation, but they 
were the only soils unchanged. The use of a chisel plow in the fall 
became the prevalent tillage practice. Also, contour plowing became 
the most prevalent direction of plowing, occurring on 5,400 acres. 
A tax of $2 . 00 per ton did not result in as dramatic a change 
as the $1.00 tax; under this program, erosion decreased to 37,723 tons, 
a decrease from the baseline erosion level of 36,092 tons. Basin 
wide net income decreased from the baseline level by $79,850 to 
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$1,702,660 . While this may be a significant effect, the difference 
in erosion abatement between tax levels of $1.00 and $2.00 per ton 
is 1,339 tons. Meanwhile, net income decreased from the $1.00 tax 
level result of $1,741,720 to the $2.00 tax level result of $1,702,660, 
a drop in net income of $39,060. At this tax level, there is no 
change in cropping practices or crop rotations from the $1 .00 tax 
level . 
The decrease in soil loss from the $1.00 tax level to the $2 .00 
tax level was entirely due to a change in tillage practice on the 
steeper slopes. Under the $1.00 tax, the D-slope classification land 
was farmed using a chisel plow in the fall in a contour direction for 
the continuous corn rotation. With the $2.00 tax per ton on soil 
erosion, these more steeply sloped soils are farmed using a chisel plow 
in the spring, still following the contour and using the continuous 
corn rotation. 
The next run involved a tax of $5.00 per ton of soil erosion. With 
a tax levy of this rate, soil erosion decreased by 45,160 tons to 
28,655 tons basin wide. Income also decreased to $1,607,310, a drop 
of $175,200. At this tax level, there is a large amount of substitution 
between tillage practices, although contour cropping and straight row 
cropping are the only conservation practices entering into the solution. 
The use of a chisel plow in the spring is now a common tillage practice 
and a zero tillage practice becomes profitable on the steeper slopes . 
The final tax level examined is the $10.00 per ton rate. A tax 
at this level reduces net income for the basin to $1,516,690,a drop of 
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$256,820 from the baseline solution . Gross soil erosion is estimated 
to be 15,835 tons a decrease of 57,980 tons from the baseline solution. 
While contour plowing was still the most prevalent plowing direction, 
a large amount of land moved from using a chisel plow in the spring 
to using a zero tillage method of plowing and planting . There was 
also a large amount of substitution between crop rotations; whereas 
under the $5.00 tax program, 2,600 acres were planted in the corn-
soybeans rotation, with the $10.00 tax, 4,700 acres used this rotation. 
The tax policy incurs certain administrative costs and these 
administrative costs are the same regardless of the tax level. These 
costs were estimated to be approximately $17,260 (see Table B. l) . As 
an attempt to present the administrative costs of each policy in a more 
integrated form, the per ton social costs of erosion abatement are 
presented in Tables 4.1 to 4.3. These are average social costs of 
abatement only to the extent that the administrative costs, as presented, 
are reflective of each program's social costs. Also included in the 
social cost is a measure of the dead weight loss of each program, seen 
as the difference between the change in income and the change in 
government revenues. No marginal social costs of abatement are given 
because the enforcement costs, which are functionally related to the 
abatement level, were not available. 
Subsidy for Soil Loss Abatement 
Under this program, a subsidy of $1.00, $2 . 00, $5.00, and $10 .00 
per ton of soil erosion abatement is offered . The subsidy is figured 
from the baseline erosion. For every ton of soil loss decreased from 
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Table 4 .1. Social cost of a one-year per ton tax program 
Tax rate (Eer ton) 
$1.00 $2.00 $5 .00 $10 .00 
Decrease in basi n 
income $40,790 $79,850 $175,310 $265,820 
Decrease i n basin soil 
erosion (tons) 34,755 36,102 45,155 57,980 
Net i ncrease in govern-
ment revenuea +17,495 +54,945 +208,515 +562,540 
Social cost of erosion 
abatement (per ton)b .33 . 69 .74 5.12 
8Net increase in government revenue is def ined to be the govern-
ment tax revenue l ess administrative costs. 
bSocial cost of erosion abatement defined as the difference 
between the change in basin i ncome and the net change in government 
revenue. 
Table 4.2. Social cost of a one-year per ton subsidy program 
Subsidi'. rate (Eer ton) 
~l. 00 ~2.00 ~5.00 $10 . 00 
I ncrease in basin 
income $50 ,790 $79,850 $175,210 $265,820 
Decrease in basin soil 
erosion (tons) 34 ,7 55 36 ,102 45, 155 57,980 
Net decrease in govern-
ment revenuea 54,205 91,655 245,225 599,250 
Social cost of erosion 
abatement (per ton)b . 39 .33 1. 55 5 . 75 
aTotal decrease in government revenue is defined to be the sum of 
the government outlays for the s ubsidy program and the administrative 
costs . 
bSocial cost of erosion abatement is defined as the difference 
between the change in basin income and the total decrease in government 
revenue. 
43c 
Table 4.3. Social cost of a one-year policy restricting per acre 
soil erosion 
Limita tion level (per acre) 
10 tons 5 t ons 3 tons 
Decrease i n basin income $20 , 260 $99,940 $152,510 
Dec r ease i n basin soil 
e r osion ( t ons) 37, 760 51,995 57,460 
Social cost of e r osion 
aba t ement (per ton)a . 97 2 . 24 2 . 94 
asocial cost of erosion abatement is defined as the sum of the 
decrease i n basin income and the administrative costs. 
the basel i ne solut ion, the farme r receives t he subsidy level. J us t as 
with the t ax so l ution, this s oi l l oss l evel is assumed to be based on 
the USLE . 
Assuming the farmer is a ne t r evenue maximizer, a per-unit 
subsidy will reduce soil erosion by t he same level as a per unit tax . 
The differen ce in the short run is t ha t income will increase. The 
r esults of the per-unit s ubsidy ana l ysis are given in Table C. 2. This 
per-unit s ubsidy program ' s admi nis trative costs and the per-ton social 
cost of erosion abatement are presented in Tables B.l and 4.2, 
respec t ively. 
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Direct Regulation of Practices 
The policy option of direct regulation of certain practices 
involves eliminating these practices from the farmer's set of choices. 
The only practice that is considered is a ban on the use of a moldboard 
plow in the fall. This ban has no effect since the preintervention 
optimal solution does not involve the use of a moldboard plow at any 
time. 
Direct Regulation of Per Acre Soil Loss 
This policy option limits soil erosion to certain levels per 
acre . This restriction can be seen in two ways: limiting average soil 
loss for the entire basin to certain levels and limiting soil loss on 
any acre to certain levels. 
The first method allows a great amount of variation in the 
erosion from fields in the basin. Erosion may vary from none to 
essentially any level within the basin, so long as the average is less 
than the limit . This method may be valid if one is more concerned with 
sediment in the stream than actual soil loss. One may be more concerned 
about the soil actually leaving the basin; in that case, it may be of 
no concern how variable erosion is within the basin. 
The second method allows less variation in soil loss than the average 
restriction. This method limits erosion on every acre within the basin 
to less than prescribed levels. The average restriction is examined 
first. The results of both the average and per acre restrictions are 
reported in Table C.3. 
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Initially an average soil loss restriction of ten tons per acre 
was imposed. This restriction, however, was not a binding restriction 
and resulted in the baseline solution being optimal. This was because 
the average loss under the baseline was less than the ten ton 
restr iction imposed . 
Nex~ an average soil loss restriction of five tons per acre was 
imposed. This became a binding restriction, decreasing basin-wide net 
revenue and basin wide soil erosion. Soil erosion for the basin was 
39,000 tons, a decrease of 34,815 tons. Basin wide net revenue 
decreased by only $1,855 to $1,780,650. Almost the entire decrease in 
erosion is due to a shift in production to contouring from straight 
row operations . There was no change in crop rotations selected and 
a shift of twenty-five acres of the most steeply sloped soil from the 
use of a chisel plow in the fall to using a chisel plow in the spring . 
The final average soil loss restriction was one of three tons 
per acre . Erosion was reduced to 23 ,400 tons for the entire basin, a 
drop of 50,415 tons. Basin wide income was $1 ,724,310 , a drop of 
$58 ,200. The decreased erosion and revenue was due in part to changes 
in crop rotations, tillage practices and conservation practices . Six 
hundred acres changed from continuous corn rotation to a corn-soybeans 
rotation on the steeper sloped soils. Twenty-nine hundred acres 
changed tillage practices, compared to the baseline solution. Of these 
2,900 acres, 2,300 acres changed to using a chisel plow in the spring 
while 600 acres changed to using a zero tillage method. All soils 
except those of slope class A adopted contour tillage under this 
restriction. 
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Under the more restrictive per acre limitation, a limit of ten 
tons per acre was first tried. This limitation served to reduce basin 
wide net revenue to $1,762,250, a decrease of $20,260 from the 
baseline solution. This same ten ton limitation r esulted in a basin 
wide gross soil loss of 36,055 tons, a drop of 37,760 tons from the 
erosion resulting from the baseline solution. Most of this decrease 
in soil erosion came about because of a change in tillage direction 
away from straight, up and down tillage toward contouring. Twenty-
eight hundred acres shifted from straight tillage to contour tillage. 
Some acreages were planted with new crop rotations ; 600 acres which 
used the con tinuous corn rotation under the baseline solution had a 
corn-soybeans rotation under the ten ton per acre limi tation. In 
addition, these same 600 acres were now tilled using a zero-tillage 
method instead of a chisel plow in the fall. 
Nex~ a per-acre soil loss restriction of five tons was imposed. 
Unde r this restriction, soil loss on any acre in the basin was not 
a l lowed to exceed five tons . Basin wide net revenue decreased by 
$99,940 from the baseline solution to $1,687,570 . Concurrently, soil 
erosion for the basin as a whole decreased to 21,820 tons, a drop of 
51,995 tons from the baseline solution. This decrease in basin wide 
soil erosion was due primarily to a shift on 2,800 acres from using 
a chisel plow in the fall to using a zero-tillage method and a shift 
on those same 2,800 acres to using contour plowing. Under the 
baseline solution, all 2,800 acres had used straight row plowing. 
The final per acre soil loss restriction used was a three tons 
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per acre maximum loss. This is a very restrictive policy because 
the more steeply sloped soils usually lose more than three tons per 
acre under almost any combination of crop rotation, tillage practice 
and conservation practice. In light of the serious restriction 
this imposes, the resulting basin wide net revenue total of $1,630,000 
is somewhat surprising. This represents a decrease of basin wide net 
revenue of $152,510 from the baseline solution. However, basin wide 
gross soil erosion decreased by 57,460 tons from the baseline solution 
level of 73,815 tons, to a level of 16,355 tons. The use of terraces 
on the most steeply sloped soils became optimal under this restriction. 
These steeply sloped soils also adopted the zero-tillage operation 
method instead of the previously used chisel plow in the fall. The 
zero-tillage method was used on 2,800 acres within the basin on the 
moderate to steeply sloped soils. The results of these restrictions 
are given in Table C.3. 
No attempt was made to determine the administrative costs of the 
first form of restriction, the average restriction for the entire basin. 
It seems this form of restriction would have its best application at the 
farm level, restricting a farm's average soil loss to some level . 
However, administrative costs were estimated for the per acre restriction 
policy; these costs are assumed not to vary as the restriction level 
changes. These costs were estimated to be $159 . 25 per farm or a basin 
wide cost of $16,560 . The per-ton social costs of erosion abatement for 
this policy are presented in Table 4.3. 
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erosion abatement of approximately 57,000 tons has an average social 
cost of approximately $2.94 per ton of abatement while a similar level 
of abatement under the tax and subsidy programs indicate an average 
social cost of $5 .12 and $5.75 per ton, respectively . These figures 
imply the policy of restriction is the most efficient. This is not 
necessarily true. 
Conversations with the Iowa Department of Environmental Quality 
and the Iowa Attorney General ' s office indicate that legal costs for 
the policy of restriction would be quite large. The general feeling 
was that in attorney's time alone, such a policy would easily require 
between fif t y and one hundr ed hours of time per case. Using the 
estimate of the number of possible cases which Seitz developed, such 
a program would imply between two and eight cases fo r the watershed in 
the first year (Seitz (32)). Assuming a per-hour cost of fifty 
dollars for an attorney's time, this policy would result in added 
legal costs of $5,000 to $40,000 for the watershed. 
If we make the assumption that the $5,000 figure applies to the 
five too restriction and the $40,000 figure applies to the three ton 
restriction, then the social costs of this policy are considerably 
higher, especially at the larger abatement level. The per ton social 
costs of abatement, under the five ton per acre policy, increase from 
$2 . 24 to $2 . 37 per ton when these addit ional legal costs are included . 
Also, the costs of the three ton per acre policy increase, but more 
dramatically ; previously these costs were $2 . 94 per ton of aba tement 
but are now $3 . 64 per ton. 
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Subsidization of Terracing Costs 
Under this policy, the costs of constructing terraces is subsidized 
at levels of 50 percent, 75 percent and 90 percent. However, this 
subsidization does not affect the baseline solution ; even at the 90 
percent subsidy level, terracing does not become optimal. It is 
entirely possible that terracing would not become optimal at any level 
less than 110 percent. This is because the use of terraces also incurs 
a yield penalty by decreasing the land available for use. So even if 
construction costs are subsidized at a 100 percent level, terracing 
would still not become optimal without some restriction on soil loss . 
In order to examine the effect of subsidizing terracing and at the 
same time restricting soil erosion, such a restriction was entered 
in the model. A subsidy of 50 percent of construction costs is 
considered in conjunc tion with a restriction on average soil loss of 
ten, five, and three tons per acre. 
Initially a restriction of ten tons per acre was tried at the 
same time construction costs were subsidized at a 50 percent level. 
This subsidy had no effect on the results; that i s , the basin wide net 
revenue and gross soil erosion were the same as under the ten ton 
per acre restriction without the subsidy. 
Next, a restriction of five tons per acre was entered in the model 
with a 50 percent construction cost subsidy. This mix of construction 
cost subsidy and per acre restriction resulted in the same basin wide 
net revenue and gross soil loss as this per acre restriction did 
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without the subsidy. This is because of the large number of choices 
available which result in soil erosion less than five tons per acre 
while yielding more net revenue than terraced operations. 
Finally, a restriction of three tons per acre was considered 
in conjunction with a subsidy of 50 percent of construction costs. 
It was at this restriction level that terracing was chosen. How-
ever, terracing was selected only on the most steeply sloped soils , 
the same result that was obtained by considering only a per acre 
restriction of three tons and not considering a subsidy . Basin wide 
net revenue inc reased but only by the subsidy level for terracing. 
Gross soil erosion was the same as under the restriction policy alone. 
Net revenue was $1,656,000 and gross erosion was estimated to be 
16,355 tons. 
The policy of subsidizing terracing costs incurs administrative 
costs of approximately $91.40 per farm or $9,500 for the entire basin. 
However, such a program, when used in conjunction with a program of 
direct regulation of gross soil loss, will incur the administrative 
costs of the direct regulation program. These costs are estimated 
to be $159.25 per farm, or approximately $16,560 for the entire basin. 
If we assume no economies in administrative costs come about because 
of the concurrence of the programs, the total administrative costs for 
such a combination would be the sum of the individual costs, or $26,060 
for the basin. 
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Subsidy of Purchase of Zero-Till Planter 
Under this policy, the purchase of a zero-till planter is sub-
sidized at levels of 50 percent, 75 percent, and 90 percent . It is 
assumed the purchase price of a zero-till planter is $5,310. However, 
the importance of the subsidy is how it affects the variable cost of 
using the zero-till planter. This effect is through two factors: the 
capital cost per acre of equipment investment, and the ownership 
costs of depreciation, taxes and insurance per acre for equipment . 
A subsidy level of 50 percent results in a purchase price of 
$2,655 and the farmers capital costs and ownership costs are figured 
on this price . The same is true for the other subsidy levels. Under 
the 50 percent subsidy program, costs per acre decrease by $.74, assuming 
an interest rate of ten percent. With the 75 percent subsidy program, 
per acre costs decrease by $1.11; the 90 percent subsidy program 
results in a per acre cost decrease of $1 . 33. These decreases in cost 
are seen to increase net revenue per acre by the same amount . 
Under each of the subsidy levels, the baseline solution did not 
change. All activities were the same and so basin wide net revenue 
remained unchanged as did total gross soil erosion. 
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CHAPTER V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND 
FURTHER RESEARCH NEEDS 
The results of the analysis of Chapter IV indicate that several 
policies are equally effective in controlling soil erosion, but at 
different levels of administrative cost . The analysis also indicates 
that several policies are ineffectual in controlling soil erosion. 
A $1 .00 per ton tax on gross soil loss resulted in an average soil 
loss per acre of 5.00 tons, as did the $1 . 00 per ton subsidy. This 
l evel was the same as the basin average under the policy restricting 
average soil loss for the entire basin to less than five tons per 
acre. Basin wide net revenue was significantly different between the 
programs; the policy of restriction resulted in net revenue of 
$1,780 ,650, while the tax policy resulted in a lower net revenue total 
of $1,741,720, a decrease of $38,930 or an average per farm decrease 
of approximately $375 . Policy cost comparisons of these two programs 
are not available. 
The results of the $2.00 tax and subsidy are very nearly 
equivalent to the ten ton per acre restriction policy, in terms of 
average gross soil loss. Under the $2 .00 tax program, average soil 
loss was estimated to be 4.84 tons per acre; under the ten ton per 
acre restriction, average soil loss was estimated to be 4 . 62 tons 
per acre, a difference in total tons for the basin of 1,668 tons . The 
analysis indicates a large difference, however, in basin net revenue . 
The $2.00 per ton tax program resulted in net revenue of $1,702,660, 
the $2 . 00 per ton subsidy resulted in net revenue of $1,854,695 and 
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the ten ton per acre restriction resulted in net revenue of $1,762,250 . 
Administrative costs also varied significantly between the programs, 
while these costs were the same for the per-ton tax and per-ton subsidy 
solutions, they were different for the per-acre restriction solution . 
The administrative costs for the tax solution were estimated to be 
$19,450 , while the administrative costs for the per acre restriction 
policy were approximately $16,495. 
This similarity between programs was present with the per-ton tax 
and s ubsidy policies of $10 . 00 per ton and the per-acre restriction of 
three tons per acre. The restriction policy resulted in an average 
gross soil loss for the basin of 2.10 tons per acre, compared with a 
loss of 2 .03 tons per acre under the tax and subsidy solutions. 
However, total net revenue did differ significantly between programs. 
The $10.00 per ton tax program resulted in net revenue of $1,516,690 , 
while the $10.00 per ton subsidy resulted in net revenue of 
$2,362 , 310. Under the three ton per acre restriction, net revenue 
was $1,630,000; these differences result in a range of income of 
$845,620, or approximately $8,130 per farm. 
While several policies were effective in controlling soil erosion , 
others were not. The ineffectual policies include subsidies for 
terrace construction costs and subsidies for the purchase of a zero-
till planter. A policy also not having any effect was the policy 
outlawing the use of a moldboard plow in the fall . 
Th e reason for the ineffectiveness of the latter policy is more a 
f unc tion of the model and the assumptions made than anything else . 
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I a s sumed all tillage practices except the zero-till method yielded 
the same number of bushels, so that the most profitable tillage 
practice became the one with the least cost; in the base run, this 
was using a chisel plow in the fall. 
The terrace subsidy program' s lack of success is due to the 
costs of terraces, both construction costs and costs of lost land. 
This program only considered construction costs, but even if these 
cos t s are subsidized 100 percent, the farmer still suffers a revenue 
loss due to lost yield . 
The program subsidizing the purchase of a zero-tillage planter 
fa i led because of the relative insignificance of the planter itself 
in the whole operation. The cost of the planter was relatively 
i nsignificant compared to the rest of the capital requirements and 
so effectively did not matter. 
Further research needs to be done in a multiperiod framework, 
because the soil erosion problem is truly a dynamic one. The farmer 
is depleting his capital stock through soil erosion and may in fact 
not be acting rationally to maximize the net present value of his 
wealth . Also, the costs to society are a dynamic problem and are 
not best seen in a one period analysis. 
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Table A.l. Fertilizer applications for corn produc tion8 
Soil tl'.Ee Rotation Nitrogen Phos2horus Potassium 
(lbs. per acre) 
Downs silt loam c-c 200 18 50 
C-B 190 18 50 
C-C-0-M-M 100 18 50 
Tama s ilt loam C-C 200 18 33 
C-B 170 18 33 
0\ 
C-C-0-M-M 100 18 33 0 
Wabash-Judson c-c 200 31 25 
C-B 190 31 25 
C-C-0-M-M 100 31 25 
Muscatine silt loam c-c 200 22 33 
C-B 190 22 33 
C-C-0-M-M 100 22 33 
8 Source: Voss (41). 
Table A. 2 . Fertilizer applications for soybeans , oats, and hay production a 
Fertilizer 
Soil tYEe Cro:e Rotation Nit r ogen Phos:ehorus Potassium 
( lbs. per acre) 
Downs silt Soybeans C-B 9 17 
loam 
Oats C-C-0-M-M 60 18 42 
Ray c-c-o-M-M 9 33 
Tama silt Soybeans C-B 13 8 
loam 
Oats C-C-0-M-M 60 18 17 
Hay C-C-0-M-M 13 17 °' ...... 
Wabash-Judson Soybeans C-B 22 
Oats C-C-0-M-M 60 31 17 
Hay C-C-0-M-M 17 
Muscatine Soybeans C-B 18 8 
s ilt loam 
Oats c- c- o- M- M 60 22 17 
Ray C-C-0-M- M 13 17 
a 
Source: Voss (41) . 
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Table A. 3a . Herbicide requirements for corn production, continuous 
corn, corn-soybeans , and com-com-oats- meadow-meadow 
rotations, on major soil typesa,b 
Application 
Rotation Soil tyEe Herbicide ~Eer acre2 
c-c Downs silt loam Lasso 2.0 quarts (qts . ) 
Atrazine 1.2 qts. 
Tama silt loam Lasso 2.5 qts. 
Atrazine 1.6 qts. 
Wabash-Judson Lasso 2 . 0 qts . 
Atrazine 1.2 qts. 
Muscatine Lasso 2.5 qts . 
silt loam 
Atrazine 1. 6 qts . 
C-B or Downs silt loam Bladex 2 . 0 qts . 
C- C- 0-M- M 
Atrazine . 8 qts . 
Tama silt loam Bladex 2 . 5 qts. 
Atrazine 1. 3 qts. 
Wabash- Judson Bladex 1. 2 qts . 
Atrazine . 6 qts . 
Muscatine silt Blad ex 2.5 qts. 
loam 
Atrazine 1. 3 qts . 
a 
Source: 1978 Chemical Crop Protection Guide (28). 
b 
These are the requirements for all tillage methods except zero-
tillage . The requirements for this method are the same for all soil 
types and are: Lasso, 2.5 qts . , Atrazine, 2.5 qts., Paraquat, 1 . 5 
pints, and X-77 (tank mix), 8 ounces per 100 gallons of water, all 
per acre . 
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Table A. 3b. Herbicide requirements for production of soybeans, corn-
soybeans rotation, on major soil typesa,b 
Soil type 
Downs silt loam 
Tama silt loam 
Wabash-Judson 
Muscatine 
silt loam 
Herbicide 
Treflon 
Sencor 
Tref lon 
Sencor 
Treflon 
Sencor 
Treflon 
Sencor 
Application 
(per acre) 
1. 5 pints (pts . ) 
.75 pts. 
2.0 pts. 
1.0 pts. 
1.0 pts . 
. 5 pts. 
2 . 0 pts. 
1.0 pts . 
aSource: 1978 Chemical Crop Protection Guide (28). 
b 
These are the requirements for all tillage methods except zero-
tillage. These requirements are given in Table 3.4c . 
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Table A. 3c. Herbicide requirements for production of soybeans, corn-
soybeans rotation, using the zero-tillage method of 
tillage, on major soil typesa 
Soil type 
Downs silt loam 
Tama silt loam 
Wabash-Judson 
Muscatine 
silt loam 
Herbicide 
Lasso 
Lor ox 
Paraquat 
X-77 (tank mix) 
Lasso 
Lorox 
Paraquat 
X-77 (tank mix) 
Lasso 
Lorox 
Paraquat 
X-77 (tank mix) 
Lasso 
Lor ox 
Paraquat 
X-77 (tank mix) 
Application 
(per acre) 
2.5 quarts (qts.) 
2.0 pounds (lbs.) 
1. 5 pints (pts . ) 
8 ounces (oz.) per 100 
gallons of water 
3.0 qts. 
3. 0 lbs. 
1. 5 pts. 
8 oz . per 100 gallons 
of water 
2.0 qts . 
1.5 lbs. 
1.5 pts. 
8 oz. per 100 gallons 
of water 
3 . 0 qts . 
3 . 0 lbs . 
1.5 pts . 
8 oz . per 100 gallons 
of water 
a 
Source: 1978 Chemical Crop Pr otection Guide (28) . 
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Table A.3d. Herbicide requirements for production of oats, corn- corn-
oats-meadow-meadow rotation, on major soil typesa 
Application 
Soil type Herbicide (per acre) 
Downs silt loam 2,4-D Amine . 75 pints 
Tama silt loam 2,4-D Amine . 75 pints 
Wabash-Judson 2,4-D Amine .75 pints 
Muscatine silt loam 2 ,4-D Amine .75 pints 
a 
Source: 1973 Chemical Crop Protection Guide (28). 
Table A. 3e. Herbicide requirement for production of hay, corn-corn-
oats-meadow-meadow rotation, on major soil typesa 
Application (per acre) 
1st year 2nd year 
Soil type Herbicide meadow meadow 
Downs silt loam Tolban 1.0 pints 
Princep 1.5 pounds 
Tama silt loam Tolban 2.0 pints 
Priocep 1.5 pounds 
Wabash-Judson Tolban 1 . 0 pints 
Princep 1 . 5 pounds 
Muscatine Tolban 2.0 pints 
silt loam 
Princep 1 . 5 pounds 
a 
Source: 1978 Chemical Crop Protection Guide (28). 
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Table A.4. Price vector 
Item Price Unit 
Corn $ 3. 20 Bushel 
Soybeans 6 . 50 Bushel 
Oats 1.60 Bushel 
Oat silage lB.00 Ton 
Hay 35.00 Ton 
Seed corn 55.00 Bag 
Soybean seed 10.25 Bag 
Oat seed 4 . 50 Bag 
Alfalfa seed 1. 20 Pound 
Nitrogen . 13 Pound 
Potassium .09 Pound 
Phosphorus .lB Pound 
Treflan 3 . 25 Quart 
Sencor sow 6.95 Quart 
Blad ex BOW 2 . 2B Quart 
Atrazine BOW 1. 95 Quart 
Lasso 4E 3.56 Quart 
Paraquat 40.00 Gallon 
2,4-D Amine .98 Quart 
X-77 tank mix 13.00 Gallon 
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APPENDIX B 
Table B. l. Administrative cos ts for tax and subsidy policies 
Type of costs 
a Farm needs analysis: 
Technician labor 
Monitoring costs: 
Technician labor 
Office labor 
Reporting costs: 
Writing 
Typing 
Office maintenance 
costs: 
Personnel 
Total 
Explanation 
Three hours per farm @ $7.00 per hour 
Two hours per farm per visit @ $7.00 per hour 
for three visits per year 
One hour per farm per year @ $4.SO per hour 
Two hours per farm per year @ $7 . 00 per hour 
One hour per farm per year @ $4.50 per hour 
Three technicians with fixed labor costs of 20% 
of their annual salary ($14,500) 
Two secretaries with fixed labor costs of 20% 
of their annual salary ($9.500) 
Costs 
(per farm) 
$21. 00 
$42.00 
$ 4.50 
$14.00 
$ 4.50 
$83 .00 
$18 .00 
$187 . 00 
a 
The farm needs analysis costs are valid only fo r the subsidy policy; total cost for the 
tax policy is then $166 .00 per farm . 
Table B.2 . Administrative costs for terracing costs subsidy 
Type of costs 
Farm needs analysis: 
Technician labor 
(to determine eligi-
bility) 
Monitoring costs: 
Technician labor 
Office labor 
Reporting costs: 
Writing 
Typing 
Office Maintenance costs : 
Personnel 
Total 
Explanation 
Fifty hours per farm 
@ $7.00 per hour 
Two hours per farm per year@ $7.00 per hour 
One hour per farm per year @ $4 . 50 per hour 
One hour per farm per year@ $7 . 00 per hour 
One half hour per farm per year @ $4.50 per hour 
One technician, with fixed labor costs of 20% 
of their annual salary ($14,500) 
One secretary, with fixed labor costs of 20% 
of her annual salary ($9.500) 
Costs 
(per farm) 
$350 . 00 
$14.00 
$ 4.50 
$ 7.00 
$ 2.25 
$27.90 
$18 . 25 
$423 . 90 
Table B.3 . Administrative costs for zero-till planter subsidy 
Type of costs 
Farm needs analysis: 
Technician labor 
Monitoring costs: 
Reporting costs: 
Writing 
Typing 
Office maintenance costs: 
Personnel 
Total 
Explanation 
One hour per farm @ $7 . 00 per hour 
None 
One half hour per year @ $7.00 per hour 
None 
One technician, with fixed labor costs of 20% 
of his annual salary ($14,500) 
One secretary, with fixed labor cos ts of 20% 
of her annual salary ($9,500) 
Costs 
(per farm) 
$7 . 00 
$3.50 
$27 .90 
$18.25 
$56.65 
Table B.4. Administrative costs for policy of direct regulation of specific practices 
Type of costs 
Farm needs analysis: 
Monitoring costs: 
Technician labor 
Off ice labor 
Reporting costs: 
Writing 
Typing 
Office maintenance: 
Personnel 
Total 
Explanation 
None 
One half hour per farm per visit, three visits 
per year@ $7 .00 per hour 
T"7enty minutes per farm per year @ $4.50 per hour 
T"7o hours per farm per year@ $7.00 per hour 
One hour per farm per year @ $4 .50 per hour 
One technician, with fixed labor costs of 20% 
of annual salary ($14,500) 
One secretary, with fixed labor costs of 20% 
of her salary ($9,500) 
Costs 
(per farm) 
$10.50 
$ 1.50 
$14.00 
$ 4.50 
$27.90 
$18 . 25 
$76 . 65 
Table B.5. Administrative costs for policy regulating soil loss by limits 
Type of costs 
Farm needs analysis: 
Technician labor 
Monitoring costs: 
Technician labor 
Office labor 
Reporting costs: 
Writing 
Typing 
Office Maintenance costs: 
Personnel 
Total 
Explanation 
Four hours per farm per visit@ $7.00 per hour, 
one analysis 
One squar e mile per day three times per year, in 
the spring, summer and fall. With 104 farms and 
approximately 8,000 acres, one technician can 
monitor 8.5 farms per day @ $56.00 per day 
One hour per farm per year @ $4.50 per hour 
Two hours per farm per year @ $7.00 per hour 
One hour per farm per year @ $4 . 50 per hour 
Three technicians, with fixed labor cos ts of 20% 
of their annual salary ($14,500) 
Two secretaries, with fixed labor costs of 20% of 
their annual salary ($9,500) 
Costs 
(per farm) 
$28.00 
$ 6.60 
$ 4 . 50 
$14.00 
$ 4 .50 
$83.00 
$18 . 00 
$158 . 60 
...... 
N 
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APPENDIX C 
Table C. l. Results of tax on soil loss 
Tax level 
per ton of Choice of tillage practice 
soil loss ~acres in each) 
ni8 per year FC SM 
1. Base run 5,900 
2. $1.00 5,800 
3. $2.00 5,260 
4. $5.00 3,000 
5.$10.00 2,500 
8FM - fall moldboard plow 
FC - fall chisel plow 
SP - spring moldboard plow 
SC - spring chisel plow 
NT - zero tillage method . 
SC 
1,900 
2,000 
2,540 
4,200 
2,500 
NT 
600 
2,800 
Basin Basin gross Ave. soil 
net soil erosion loss per acre 
revenue (tons) (tons) 
$1,782,510 73,815 9.46 
1,741,720 39,060 5.00 
1,702,660 37 '723 4.84 
1,607,300 28,660 3.67 
"'-J 
1,516,690 15,835 2.03 .i:-
Table C. 2. Results of subsidizing soil loss abatement 
Subsidy level 
per ton of Choice of tillage pr actice 
soil loss (acres in each) 
abated FMa FC 
1. Base run 5,900 
2 . $1. 00 5,800 
3. $2 . 00 5,260 
4 . $5.00 3,000 
5.$10 . 00 2,500 
8FM - fall moldboard plow 
FC - fall chisel plow 
SP - spr ing moldboard plow 
SC - spring chisel plow 
NT - zero tillage method. 
SM SC 
1,900 
2,000 
2,540 
4 , 200 
2,500 
NT 
600 
2,800 
Basin 
net 
revenue 
$1,782,510 
1,823,300 
1,862,360 
1,957, 720 
2,048,330 
Basin gross Ave. soil 
soil er osion loss per acre 
(tons) (tons) 
73,815 9 . 46 
39,060 5 . 00 
37, 723 4.84 
28,660 3.67 
-....J 
15,835 2 . 03 1..11 
Table C.3. Results of policy directly controlling soil loss through limitations 
Choice of tillage practice 
Limitation (acres in each) 
levels ma FC SM 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Base run 5,900 
10 tons 
average 5,900 
5 tons 
average 5 , 775 
3 t ons 
average 3,000 
10 tons 
per acre 5,200 
5 tons 
per acre 3,000 
3 tons 
per acre 3,000 
aFM - fall moldboard plow 
FC - fall chisel plow 
SP - spring moldboard plow 
SC - spring chisel plow 
NT - zero tillage method . 
SC 
1,900 
1,900 
2,025 
4,200 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
NT 
600 
600 
2,800 
2,800 
Basin Basin gross 
net soil erosion 
revenue (tons) 
$1,782,510 73,815 
1,782,510 73,815 
1,780,650 39 , 000 
1,724,310 23,400 
1,762,250 36,055 
1,682,570 21,820 
1,630,000 16,355 
Ave. soil 
loss per acre 
(tons) 
9 . 46 
9 . 46 
5 . 00 
....., 
3 . 00 °' 
4 .62 
2.80 
2.10 
